Egypt's Dam Problem: Who Really Controls the Nile?

 

 The River Nile is arguably the most integral factor influencing Egypt development throughout the nation's great history. The river has moulded the nation's economy and culture, being described as the 'principal artery of life in Egypt' (Hassan et al., 2007: 26). Almost all Egyptian water is supplied by the Nile, with just a 1% reduction in the river's volume having grave effects on Egyptian agriculture (Batstone, 2008). Egypt's higher levels development and economic success over the last century are largely attributed to its disproportionate use and access to the Nile compared to other neighboring riparian states, but Ethiopia for over a decade now has been challenging this and is determined to prioritise its own development, even if this is at the cost of harming the Egyptian economy (Hassan et al., 2007).  

 Since colonial powers were present in the region  Egypt has largely controlled Nile waters from the source through to mouth due to a series of treaties and agreements signed throughout the 20th century (Djomo et al., 2021). In 1929, Egypt and Britain signed the 'Nile Waters Agreement' which in essence granted Egypt sovereignty over the Nile and ever since remained a point of dispute (Djomo et al., 2021). The agreement explicitly banned any construction or manufacturing practices along the Nile which could potentially reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt and this was followed by further amendments in 1959 (Batstone, 2008). The Free Egyptian Officers (FEO) reinforced the original treaty, following the coup in 1952, to permit them to construct the Aswan High Dam as well as establishing the river's annual flow to be 84 billion cubic metres, with 55.5 billion allocated to Egypt for consumption and the remainder split between Sudan and loss due to evaporation from the reservoir created for the new High Dam (Djomo et al., 2021). Protecting Egypt's right to Nile waters was crucial for the Egyptian government as there is enormous competition between the riparian states for crop production and export, particularly cotton which requires vast amount of water to produce, and therefore Egypt wanted to ensure its supply (Hassan et al., 2007). However, as other neighbouring states, such as Ethiopia, weren't a party to this agreement they disregard it, especially since the source of the Nile is within their territories, and aren't concerned about breaking the terms of it, as Egypt argues Ethiopia has done by building the GERD (Djomo et al., 2021). Nevertheless, Egypt sees Ethiopia's construction and use of the GERD as a breach of international water law (Cascão et al., 2016) and is now actively preparing for military action, as well as using its geoeconomic stature within the region to create alliances with surrounding nations, which I will be discussing in detail in the following post (Hassan et al., 2007).

Figure 1: Egyptian and Sudanese military generals at the 'guardians of the Nile' military drill

 As of September 2023, Ethiopia confirmed that it had finishing filling the reservoir behind GERD, a process lasting three years, despite Egypt's request to spread it over 12-21 years (BBC, 2023). Sinc Ethiopia began filling the reservoir and reducing the flow of water downstream, Egyptian officials have been revoking the treaties of 1929 and 1952, however the Ethiopian government has little regard for these (Hassan et al., 2007). The international nature of this river, alongside its great domestic importance for each riparian state, necessitates and clear and just agreement regarding the river's management and permissible uses (Hassan et al., 2007). Since 2015 Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have been at the negotiating table, however these talks have repeatedly broken down and the preparation for war has already commenced (BBC, 2023).